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Safety regulation can decrease the frequent accidents in sea transportation, but aspects of the existing
regulations are found to contribute negatively to safety. Earlier studies suggest other framework condi-
tions to inﬂuence maritime safety more than regulation, without reviewing the relation between the
maritime context and regulation. Therefore, this paper explores maritime regulators’ safety-related deci-
sions. The data consist of interviews with regulators and facts about other actors (i.e., politicians, shipping
companies, interests groups, and the media) in the maritime transport arena. The ﬁndings, which are
based on safety, decision-making, and arena theories, are not described by earlier research.
Primarily, I ﬁnd that a paralysis constrains safety regulation. Despite wanting a safe industry, transport
competition leads the maritime actors to disagree about the priority of safety or proﬁt, which paralyzes
safety regulation development and constrains the regulators and their discretionary space (where they
enforce the right safety regulations for the right sectors). Many of the decision criteria with which regu-
lators must comply are forced upon them by others, so that regulators see them as constraints. Safety reg-
ulation is further weakened when market forces inﬂuence both regulation-making and enforcement. The
ﬁndings demonstrate that industrial or political actors do not prioritize safety in practice; however, safety
priority could lift maritime transport above the choice between safety and survival.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. The regulator’s lot
The safest form of transport is by sea, but the number of serious
maritime incidents has risen over the last decade (IMO, 2012).
Globally, there are several large-scale accidents every year, such
as the disasters of the ferry Sewol and freighter Grand Fortune I in
2014. In 2013, at least 69 large vessels were declared total losses,
with over 600 casualties (Maritime Bulletin, 2014) out of approxi-
mately 1,300,000 seafarers worldwide (IMO, 2012). This paper
explores safety regulation from the viewpoint of the regulators.
Regulation can be an important defense against organizational
accidents if one has resourceful regulators with discretionary space
(Reason, 1997; Rasmussen, 1997; Walters et al., 2011). Regulation
motivates maritime organizations to take safety precautions
(Kongsvik et al., submitted for publication; Knapp and Van de
Velden, 2011), but the trend toward auditability and accountability
as safety measures can marginalize useful safety practices and
improvisation abilities (Almklov et al., 2014; Dekker, 2014;
Størkersen and Johansen, 2014; Bieder and Bourrier, 2013). In spite
of such secondary effects, research shows this type of regulationcontinues due to lack of resources: maritime deaths in poor sectors
are not given public attention, let alone funding for regulatory
development (Lindøe et al., 2011). Societies tend to be skeptical
about expanding regulation in general, so regulators are often lag-
ging compared to industry innovation (Walters et al., 2011;
Johnson, 2014). Rather, multiple transnational actors in global
industries come in, alongside the national regulators, with heavy
means to inﬂuence standards and safety measures, thus adding
complexity and uncertainty, and corrupting the regulators’ work
(Bratspies, 2009). At the same time, legislators and other govern-
mental institutions with different objectives give the regulators
responsibilities without authority (over legislation, insurance,
market forces, etc.), and then tend to blame the regulator if a case
gets negative attention (Baram and Lindøe, 2014). Reason (1997)
labels it ‘‘the regulator’s unhappy lot’’: regulators are to take care
of societal interests, but with limited discretionary space, funding,
or understanding. No wonder other framework conditions seem to
inﬂuence maritime safety more than regulation (Kongsvik et al.,
submitted for publication; Knudsen and Hassler, 2011; Walters
and Bailey, 2013). Earlier research does not explain further how
the maritime context inﬂuences the regulators.
In this paper, I explore maritime regulations by asking Norwe-
gian maritime regulators what affects the regulators’ decisions when
Accidents 
Compeon 
Safety 
demands
Proﬁt
demands
Marime actors 
disagrees:  
Paralysis in safety 
regulaon 
development
Regulators 
constrained 
from enforcing 
regulaons to 
opmize safety
Doubly weakened 
safety regulaon 
(Market forces 
important both in 
creaon and 
enforcement) 
Fig. 1. Competing problems and priorities leads to weakened safety regulation in maritime transport.
1 Rosness (2009) describes ﬁve decision settings: operations, business manage-
ment, administrative and technical functions, political arenas, and crisis handling. For
an example of research using his model on operational decision-making in Norwegian
ﬁsh-farming, see Størkersen (2012).
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competition makes many maritime actors prioritize proﬁt over
safety regulation, which paralyzes safety regulation development
and constrains the maritime safety regulators (see Fig. 1).
In the analysis, I use literature about safety, decision-making,
and arena theory, which is explained in Section 2. As in arena anal-
ysis (Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008), my data materials con-
sist of document analysis and interviews, though the interviews
are only with the regulators (see method description in Section
3). The regulators’ descriptions of their own decision-making are
voiced in Section 4, categorized by the arena actors to which they
relate the subjects, together with some information about the
actors. In Section 5, the regulators’ decision-making is analyzed,
followed by a discussion of the situation of the maritime arena,
to ﬁnd out what affects the regulators’ decision-making and to
present the contents of Fig. 1.
2. Literature about regulatory decision-making in an arena
Decision-making and risk literature often mention that regula-
tors are dependent on politicians and other actors around them.
Yet studies seldom provide insights about the regulators’ perspec-
tives on their regulation and the context. To analyze what affects
the regulators’ decisions, I use an arena model (Renn, 1992) as a
starting point to employ further decision-making theory (literature
overview by Rosness, 2009).
As safety is a background subject here, this term must be clari-
ﬁed ﬁrst (according to Rasmussen, 1997, 184): ‘‘Safety depends on
the control of work processes so as to avoid accidental side effects
causing harm to people, environment, or investment’’. A business
can be safe to both people and economic proﬁt. However, some-
times all negative side effects are unavoidable, and a value conﬂict
arises over which of the positive effects one should prioritize (for
instance, personal health or environment). Whether an operation
is safe or not depends to a large degree on decisions made, before
and during the operations, by groups of personnel at multiple soci-
etal levels and settings.
2.1. The arena approach
The arena approach can help explain group responses to risk
issues and interpret institutional and political actions (Renn,
1992), such as the regulators’ decision-making. An arena is a sphere
or domainwith certain participants, policies, interactions, and deci-
sion-making processes (Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008). In an
arena, an actor has discretionary space – room for decisions and
actions within a system (Dekker, 2012). The arena model (Fig. 2)
illustrates patterns of such actors and the activities between them.
Arena theory is based on assumptions that the actors can inﬂu-
ence and convince their decision-makers (by arguing or through
public pressure) if they have sufﬁcient resources available (Renn,
1992). Formal power is often not enough to get successfully one’s
preferred actions acted out in an arena. Authority must be accom-
panied with other valuable resources, such as social inﬂuence or
ﬁnancial capacity. Many arenas are so full of political constraints
that decisions are not necessarily made in accordance with the val-ues of any of the participants. If none of the actors can dominate
the process, there can be a case of political paralysis and issues
can remain unresolved (Renn, 1992). Political paralysis occurs
when several actors fail to cooperate and decide on collective mea-
sures because of different values and goals.2.2. Decision-making on the regulatory level(s)
Decision-making is seen as an individual or collective activity,
over shorter or longer time, more or less intentional, constrained
and shaped by context and individual qualities (Rosness, 2009). A
decision is close every timeanactor can choose to act out other alter-
natives. It is difﬁcult to separate thedecision fromthedecision-mak-
ing process, and it is important to take into account the social
contextof thework (March, 1994;Rasmussen, 1997;Rosness, 2009).
Rosness (2009) characterizes decision settings based on prox-
imity to the hazard and level of authority.1 Currently, regulatory
institutions are juggling between political arenas, business manage-
ment, and administrative and technical support functions. Table 1
shows the dominant constraints and decision criteria in these deci-
sion settings (Rosness, 2009).
In the business management setting, managers rely on informa-
tion from subordinates, and might not be able to weigh a full set
of pros and cons. They are concerned with economic outcome and
can be motivated to continue operations in conﬂict with safety
(Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1997). Often, business decision-makers
easily understand the process and value of the product (which can
lead to bankruptcy if not handled right), while it is harder to recog-
nize the processes and value of personnel or organizational safety
(which can lead to catastrophe if not treated right) (Reason, 1997).
This implies that they can value short-term ﬁnancial and survival
criteria rather than welfare, safety, and environmental criteria
(Rasmussen, 1997). Employees are often pushed to work fast even
if, theoretically, they should strive instead for quality. Hollnagel
(2009) calls this the efﬁciency/thoroughness trade-off (ETTO)
principle.
The administrative and technical support functions refer to per-
sonnel with limited formal authority, such as regulatory staff.
Osmundsen et al. (2012) have found that the Norwegian Food
Safety Authority personnel are obliged to make decisions that bal-
ance between societal interests and industrial interests, but that
rigid regulations can limit their authority, constrain the decision-
making, and sometimes result in irrational decisions.
In the decision setting of political arenas there are likely to be con-
ﬂicting interests, as pointed out in arena theory. For instance, one
often hears that ‘‘safety has a high priority, but so has employment
and trade balance’’ (Rasmussen, 1997, 184). Interest groups are
importanthere, due to thepower in lobbies and theability of interest
groups to raise the voice of the public (Lindøe et al., 2011). Proﬁt pri-
ority is often the case amongst maritime industry actors (Walters
and Bailey, 2013).
Fig. 2. The actors in an arena (Renn, 1992, as printed in Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008, 1120).
Table 1
Characteristics of the three relevant decision settings (Rosness, 2009, 809).
Decision setting Dominant constraints Dominant decision criteria
Business management Information-processing capacity Optimize proﬁt (or other key performance indicators)
Avoid trouble
Dependence on information ﬁltered by subordinates Ensure commitment or compliance
Efﬁcient decision-making
Administrative and technical support functions Limited hands-on knowledge Comply with rules and standards
No authority to enforce decisions Consistency
Optimize a single attribute
Political arenas Conﬂicts of interest Robust consensus
Changing constellations of power Secure status of decision-maker
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This study based on interviews with persons from the maritime
industry in different Norwegian research projects during the last
decade (i.e., for the arena of aquaculture, see Fenstad et al., 2009;
for offshore platform service, see Fenstad et al., 2010; for cargo
shipping, see Størkersen et al., 2011; for high-speed passenger ves-
sels, see Kongsvik and Johansen, 2013). Sources for the quotations
given in this paper’s results are speciﬁcally group and single inter-
views from 2011 and 2012, in the research project Regulative ratio-
nalities and safety culture development.2 The 17 interviewed persons
work at the Norwegian Maritime Authority and the Norwegian
Coastal Administration (see Table 2). These representatives were
selected because they manage especially relevant departments or
have knowledge speciﬁc to the department’s work and contact with
the industry or other actors. Selections were also made so that, alto-
gether, knowledge from most parts of the maritime regulatory orga-
nizations was covered.
The interviews took place at the authorities’ ofﬁces at different
locations, and were executed by one to three of the project’s2 The project aims to ﬁnd out how culture inﬂuences safety on various organiza-
tional and societal decision-making levels – from the workers on deck, through the
shipowners, to the authorities. We started with studying how the authorities view
their own role when it comes to safety in the industry, and continued with asking
employees in industry organizations about their roles and their views of the other
levels.researchers. All interviews were semi-structured research inter-
views of 1–2 h duration, and discussed the regulators’ role to main-
tain safe maritime operations, how that role is performed in
practice, how regulators cooperate with each other and others,
etc., were discussed. The interviews were recorded, transcribed,
and translated into English. The representatives from the two reg-
ulators had mainly the same views in most cases (which were
quite surprising in themselves).
In the analyzing process, I applied the arena model (see Fig. 1
and the explanation in Section 2). The model was not used to select
interviews, but it was implemented after data gathering as an anal-
ysis tool to categorize the data, to ﬁnd patterns and to get an over-
view of how the regulators view the participants, interactions,
challenges, and possibilities for decision-making in the arena (as
suggested by Georgakopoulos and Thomson, 2008). Consequently,
the empirical results in Section 4 in this paper are organized with
respect to the actors of the arena.
Before the results of each actor type are presented in Section 4,
each actor is introduced in a table. These facts are used to give an
impression of the actor and of the arena altogether. Even though
the different actors are presented brieﬂy in the tables, all qualita-
tive results are subjective perspectives of the regulators only. Con-
sequently, this study mostly reﬂects the views of the regulators,
and does not take into account the possible perspectives of other
actors.
As this study only reﬂects the views of selected representatives
for Norwegian maritime regulators, the ﬁndings cannot be general-
Table 2
Data used to ﬁnd the results in Section 4.
Maritime authority Coastal administration Total
Interviews 9 3 12
Interviewed 13 key persons in departments working with strategic safety, laws and regulations,
international affairs, passenger ships, cargo ships, inspection, and working and living
environment
4 key persons in departments working with
coastal administration, ships and safety
17
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on some general aspects of the international maritime arena or
general regulators’ discretionary space in relation to other actors.4. Empirical results about the authorities’ views on safety
regulation
In the interviews, the regulators from the Norwegian Maritime
Authority and the Norwegian Coastal Administration characterize
their decision-making. Fig. 3 provides an overview of the maritime
transport arena based on information from the interviews.
This section is divided into subsections of the arena-actor types,
depending by whom the regulators perceive their decisions are
inﬂuenced. Each subsection starts with information about the cur-
rent actor before continuing with the regulators’ descriptions from
the interviews. Altogether, this will give a picture of the Norwegian
maritime arena, with perspectives from the regulators.4.1. National rule enforcers: regulations and internal discussions
As described, two national regulators facilitate for maritime
safety by controlling the vessels or maintaining the infrastructure
along the Norwegian coast: The Maritime Authority and the
Coastal Administration. See more information about them in
Table 3.
Representatives from both the Maritime Authority and the
Coastal Administration say they have some discretionary space to
act on their own to prevent accidents in maritime transport, evenFig. 3. Actors important for the Norwthough they work with limited resources and need to discuss inter-
pretations and priorities among their peers.
When asked, the regulators state that they are satisﬁed with the
policies they take care of (even though many add that the rules are
comprehensive). Most of the regulators started their interview
with a basal premise from the Norwegian Law on Ship Safety:
Safety is the responsibility of the shipowners, and regulations
require them to fulﬁll a minimum safety standard. All the repre-
sented regulators feel that they still play an important role in the
creation of safety along the coast. They give and deny permits,
make regulations (for instance speed limitations for certain areas),
improve the emergency preparedness in an area or sub-branch,
interact with the local authorities, try to make practical and man-
ageable instructions, handle complaints, and so on.
We actually have an easy job. We’re put here to exercise regulatory
requirements – equality for the law. Whether we like the complain-
ers or not, we maintain equality for the law. We have to focus on
the facts, no matter what.
However, the regulators also underline some negative aspects
with the policy-making and the formation of the regulations. Much
of the Norwegian maritime regulation originates from interna-
tional legislation. For instance is the International Safety Manage-
ment-code integrated in the Norwegian Law of Ship Safety.
National formulations are sought from cooperation between
unions, employer organizations, and regulators (although several
of the interviewed regulators point out the lack of funding to carry
out such thorough processes). It is said that many of the rules are
marked by ﬁghts between the parties; ‘‘who gets through or whoseegian maritime transport arena.
Table 3
The Norwegian maritime regulators.
Norwegian Coastal Administration Norwegian Maritime Authority
Source: Coastal Administration (2014) Source: Maritime Authority (2014)
Employees Approximately 1000 307
Tasks Responsible for infrastructure: fairways and ﬁshing ports, port facility
security, pilot and navigation services, vessel trafﬁc services, national
preparedness against acute pollution, transport planning. Exercising
maritime legislation
Supervision of the industry: Controls Norwegian vessels according to
national regulations, and other vessels in Norwegian ports according to
international regulations. Assure that Norwegian shipowners hold high
safety and environmental standards and employ seafarers with good
qualiﬁcations and working and living conditions. Manages the Norwegian
ship registers
Goal ‘‘To make our coast and waters the safest and purest in the world’’ ‘‘To be a visible actor for sea safety in a clean environment’’
Owner (s) At the time of the interviews: The Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs (in
charge of coastal industry and pollution preparedness)
The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries (responsible for designating
industrial and seafood policy with an eye to the future)
From 2014: Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications
(responsible for framework conditions for postal, telecommunications, and
transport activities; roads, coastal environment and port and sea transport
policy)
and
The Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment (responsible for
carrying out environmental policies)
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entering the politics’’. The regulators’ political owners (see Fig. 3
and Section 4.4) are also in position to change the focus of ﬁnances
and priorities. Even if regulations favor safety, the regulators can
feel pressured to enforce the owner’s goals of continuing trade,
industry, and culture – at the expense of safety.
‘‘We want to get most safety for least resources’’, repeat the rep-
resentatives. They talk about how some safety measures are worth
the investment (life vest campaigns and so on), while others are
important but too expensive (for instance, improved requirements
for safety ladders, mandatory pilots, and increased safety crew).
Subjects that are internally debated are competence, knowl-
edge, and information gathering. The Maritime Authority is espe-
cially engaged in how much data they need to issue certiﬁcates,
when they do not have the time to seek out every piece of
information.
4.2. International institutions
The transport industry is essentially international. For instance,
90% of the Norwegian ﬂeet is active abroad, and foreign ships are
frequent in Norwegian waters (Norwegian Shipowners’
Association, 2014). Norwegian regulations include a complex set
of ratiﬁed international rules, which the Maritime Authority
enforces over the Norwegian shipowners and vessels (Pettersen
and Bull, 2010) (see Table 4).
The Norwegian regulators are connected tightly to international
institutions, whose regulation-making processes are thorough andTable 4
International government in the Norwegian maritime arena.
EU The European Union (EU) is an economic and politica
founded on treaties that are negotiated, agreed, and r
Countries not in the EU but part of the European Econo
states (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) contribute
no representation in or formal opportunity to inﬂuen
(Wikipedia, 2014; EFTA, 2014)
ILO Policies of the International Labour Organization (ILO
two government delegates: an employer delegate and
to vote freely when establishing conventions. Membe
(MLC) sets labor rights for seafarers, and thereby fair c
entered into force worldwide in 2013. (ILO, 2014a,b)
IMO The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the
security, and prevention of pollution. The conventions
government has consented to a formulated conventio
enforce it. It often takes years to make a convention.
National and port-state
enforcement
The Norwegian Maritime Authority enforces Norwegi
enforces directly the general international conventiontime-consuming. An example from the IMO that was emphasized
in the interviews is a term about life-raft hooks, which the regula-
tors tell was completed ten years after initiation of the process
because ‘‘consensus was not made until more accidents had
occurred.’’
The Maritime Authority representatives in particular underline
that the international standards are bound to be frustratingly low.
As long as lobbyists can argue that a country or an industry cannot
afford higher standards, the international standards will not con-
tain high safety demands (such as those made by the new Mari-
time Labour Convention, in the Norwegian regulators’ opinions).
Even though many of the interviewed regulators are dissatisﬁed
with the safety standards on many vessels, their experience is that
they neither can make Norwegian rules too strict compared to
other nations’ rules. Because maritime transport is so internation-
ally oriented, a shipowner can perceive it as easier to ﬂag out of
Norway and into ﬂags of convenience, than to comply with ﬁrm
regulations. Norwegian ofﬁcials say that they fear a situation
where no vessels are registered in Norway and, consequently, are
out of reach of the Norwegian regulators. They also fear that no for-
eign vessels or companies will bring their business to Norway.
According to the regulators, strict Norwegian special-safety
demands will scare business and national states, and in turn lead
to global protection. Norwegian politicians do not want to encour-
age this.
Vessels registered in other countries must be treated carefully
as long as they meet the international standards, even if they do
not comply with all Norwegian regulations. This is said to bel partnership between 28 European countries. Every action taken by the EU is
atiﬁed by all the EU member states (EU, 2013)
mic Area (EEA) must adopt parts of EU Law to enjoy free trade with the EU. These
to the formation of new, relevant legislation at an early stage. However, they have
ce further decision-making in the EU, although they are obliged to ratify it
) are set by the annual International Labour Conference. Each member state has
a worker delegate. Every delegate has the right to express himself or herself and
r states can choose to ratify the conventions. ILO’s Maritime Labour Convention
ompetition for shipowners. The MLC was adopted by the Conference in 2006 and
United Nations’ specialized agency with responsibility for maritime safety and
in the IMO are established through consensus by all member states. When every
n (such as the International Safety Management Code, ISM), they are obliged to
(IMO, 2012)
an regulations with ratiﬁed conventions over Norwegian registered vessels, and
s over other vessels in Norwegian ports (Pettersen and Bull, 2010)
Table 5
The Norwegian maritime transport industry in numbers.
Maritime transport versus air, rail,
and roads
Maritime transport competes with transport on road, on rail, and in air. In Norway, many coastal communities depend on sea
transport due to the long coastline. In 2013, sea transport had 52 million passengers (less than rail and roads) and carried 88
million tons of cargo (less than roads). (Statistics Norway, 2014e)
Industry value The Norwegian ﬂeet is the world’s ﬁfth largest in value (Norwegian Shipowners’ Association, 2014). In 2012, the production value
in water transport was 20.9 billion US dollars (while the total production value in the general Norwegian transport industry was
52.6 billion USD) (Statistics Norway, 2014d)
Employees and company types App. 152,120 employees are in Norwegian water transport, with 21,061 enterprises (Statistics Norway, 2014d) consisting mostly
of 1–10 employees and 1–10 vessels. Transport vessels include cargo and passenger ships: oil tankers, well boats, vehicle carriers,
ferries, express boats, general cargo vessels, and more. This is a complex group, with very different framework conditions. Some
companies and sectors have low economic margins, such as Norwegian coastal cargo (Størkersen et al., 2011). Lindøe et al. (2011,
94) have described national and international bulk transport as complex, with ‘‘low cost’’ organizations using short-term contracts
and ‘‘third world’’ work forces. In contrast to this, petroleum supply and large international cargo companies have ﬁnancial muscle
Vessels, numbers 2767 transport vessels were registered in Norway in 2013, for both coastal and international activitya (Statistics Norway, 2014a,b)
Flags A substantial number of foreign registered ships and seafarers sail along the Norwegian coast. Some vessels originate in the
countries they ﬂag. Others have Norwegian owners, but are ﬂagged in a country with different regulations (for instance, regarding
tax, demands, and prohibitions) (Kristiansen, 2005)
Risk of death In 2013, 281 Norwegian seafarers were injured and 5 killed (Statistics Norway, 2014c). The risk varies across the different
transport branches. Seafarers’ risk of death is 10 to 20 times greater than for onshore workers (Norwegian National Insurance
Service, 2006). Globally, there were 600 causalities in the same year (Maritime Bulletin, 2014) among app. 1,300,000 seafarers
(IMO, 2012)
Vessels lost In 2013, 18 Norwegian registered vessels were totally lost, and 246 partially lost (Statistics Norway, 2014c). Globally in 2013, 69
large vessels were declared total losses (Maritime Bulletin, 2014)
a The transport ﬂeet is also called the merchant ﬂeet, but the formal deﬁnition of merchant ﬂeet only includes vessels that do not carry passengers and are 100 gross tons or
more (Statistics Norway, 2014a). In this study, passenger vessels and smaller freighters are included.
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ulators are supposed to control their ships, and other nations have
to trust them to do that.
If a boat with a Bahamas ﬂag lies in the harbor of [a Norwegian
city], it’s the Bahamas who lie in this harbor. And that’s pretty
important, I tell you.4.3. Companies in the industry
See Table 5 for facts about the Norwegian maritime industry. As
previously stated, the Norwegian shipowners are responsible for
the safety on their ships along the coast (Lovdata, 2007). The reg-
ulators want the companies to upgrade the safety standards from
the regulation’s minimum on the companies’ own initiatives. In
addition, the regulators initiate safety measures and run cam-
paigns in branches and on vessels with a large number of accidents
and limited industry safety initiative. The regulators indicate that
their efforts to promote safety in maritime transport are indeed
affected by the companies. All interviewed regulators want to level
with the industry, but they also see that some maritime transport
companies only make safety investments when sanctions are
possible.
To invest in safety equipment for [50,000 US dollars] can be a hard
nut. But as soon as there are requirements, things happen.
Representatives from both regulatory bodies highlight how it
would have been safer with a newer ﬂeet with better safety equip-
ment, ‘‘but’’, they always add, ‘‘there are all sorts of considerations to
make’’: Norwegian shipping is threatened by international ship-
ping, while all shipping is threatened by other transport types.
The competition is lowering prices. The regulators are very aware
of the pressured economic state in parts of the maritime transport
arena. The Maritime Authority representatives, in particular, are
clear about their focus on branches with small safety budgets. They
emphasize that regulations cannot push the business out of the
country or over to trucks by demanding expensive safety mea-
sures. Some, therefore, reluctantly understand the ministries’
priorities.
You always have to balance on that border. We‘ll never get a
chance to think of only profession. We can argue for it, then handit over to the ministry. And in some cases the ministry will get back
to us and say ‘‘this isn’t working’’.
They do not want to shut down the business for a shipowner, a
local community, or a maritime transport branch (for example,
sand transport) as long as the actors can be said to comply with
regulations. Therefore, the Norwegian maritime regulations cannot
be too demanding, as compared to the rest of the maritime world
or the transportation industry. Some of the persons interviewed
believe that the priorities of the regulatory bodies would have been
different if they had other owners. This will be discussed further in
the next section.
4.4. National political institutions
Much of the political implications on regulation have been
apparent already in the sections about rule enforcers, international
regulation, and the companies, so this section is mainly about the
differences in priorities between politicians and regulators (see the
national political institutions’ goals in Table 6).
In all interviews, the regulators emphasize the border area
between professional judgment and politics (as seen in the last
quote). The regulators understand their profession to be safety (or
safety-related decision-making), while politics are perceived as val-
ues handed down from the politicians. This tension between safety
and the priorities of the ministries is stressed strongly by the reg-
ulators. They worry that politicians can make decisions that can be
problematic for safety. At the same time, the regulators are aware
of the importance of satisfactory business conditions for the indus-
try, so as to be able to have an industry to regulate. They still regret
that politicians have a veto, are inﬂuenced by the public, media,
lobbies, the next election, etc. – and can delete the work of hun-
dreds of regulators in one media interview. Some of the regulators
reveal that they rather wish they were owned by a hypothetical
Sea Safety Ministry:
There’s so much politics in the picture here. We’re owned by min-
istries [. . .]. So it’s not always that industry and trade and safety are
very well united. [. . .] There’s no Sea Safety Ministry, for instance.
I’m not saying I take easy on [the actual priorities of the owners].
But I say that the combination isn’t always as easy. It can be a chal-
lenge sometimes.
Table 6
Goals of Norwegian political institutions relevant for the maritime arena.
General goal All Norwegian governments of the last decade have aimed at getting more transport from road to sea (Norwegian Cabinet, 2005, 2009, 2013)
Goals and values of
ministries
The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries (which owns the Maritime Authority) is responsible for the government’s industrial, shipping,
and seafood policy, so as to maximize value creation in the Norwegian economy. The Ministry promotes trade and entrepreneurial spirit.
(Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, 2014)
The Ministry of Transport and Communications (which now owns the Coastal Administration) is responsible for transport,
telecommunication, and postal policies, including sustaining coastal environment and culture (Ministry of Transport and Communications,
2014). The Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs (owner of the Coastal Administration at the time of the interviews) also were to
maximize the ﬁshery and aquaculture trade and industries
3 Hood (2010) writes extensively about the negative and positive consequences of
ctors’ blame avoidance.
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When the regulators mention the public they often refer to
what they hear through the media, but sometimes the public also
knocks on their door, as complainers, interest groups, or others
with opinions (presented in Table 7). The regulators do not talk
much about the nongovernment organizations and lobbying, but
they highlight that there is a tight connection between those cases
the media draws attention to, and the ﬁelds in which the interest
groups are engaged.
The experience of the interviewed regulators is that the media
are, to some extent, in a position to affect how the resources are
being prioritized. Some say that ‘‘we jump when the media tell us
to.’’ Several examples given in the interviews state this.
We had a case about dangerous cargo on ferries, with lots of trou-
ble and lots of publicity in the papers, where we in a way were
forced into a process. And where the ministry pushed us to ﬁnd a
solution. Yes, we absolutely have those cases.
Another example say that because of earlier media attention,
there now is a focus in Norway on safety for ferries instead of ves-
sels with more serious accidents.
The media’s power, especially over the political institutions, is a
dilemma for the regulatory bodies, but many of the representatives
underline that, usually, the general operation of the organizations
does not get disturbed by media attention.
5. Discussion of the situation in the maritime arena
The empirical data from the regulator interviews and the infor-
mation tables can be analyzed to ﬁnd what affects Norwegian mar-
itime regulators’ decision-making. First, in this section the
regulators’ decision criteria and constraints are discussed accord-
ing to Rosness (2009) (see Table 1). This leads to a discussion of
how the maritime-arena context affects regulation.
5.1. The regulators’ decisions and discretionary space
All decisions made by the Maritime Authority and the Coastal
Administration are intended to provide safety along the Norwegian
coast. This coincides with the top value of both organizations: safe
sailing (Maritime Authority, 2014; Coastal Administration, 2014).
Compliance and consistency are also important criteria, common
to bureaucratic rationality, to preserve justice. Regulators are to
be fair, and treat every client equally.
So, safety, compliance, and consistency are the fundamental
decision criteria for the Norwegian maritime regulators. But to
be practical (and avoid trouble), they also need to make decisions
based on optimization of proﬁt, efﬁciency, and consensus, with its
various constraints.
Within their discretionary space, the regulators strive to reach
robust consensus. The regulators must suggest and enforce regula-
tions upon which the ministries, the public, the industry, and inter-
est groups can agree. Now and then, the decision is not the
regulators’ to make; for example, when politicians have decidedon an action after a media outbreak. Sometimes the regulators dis-
agree with the priorities of politicians. In order to make sense
when communicating with the industry, regulators must still
translate the conﬂicting priorities into one integrated meaning.
The regulators master translation and balance within their limited
discretionary space. Yet they ﬁnd it difﬁcult to act in many mari-
time branches because the industry associations have considerable
power and their own agenda (as also found by Lindøe et al. (2011)).
Regulators toil to show the maritime industry that it is necessary
to strike a balance between production and protection, to neither
become bankrupt nor create a catastrophe, and that it can be eco-
nomical to think in long terms and prioritize welfare, safety, and
environment (as stressed by Reason (1997) and Rasmussen
(1997)). However, the conditions rarely give the regulators the
opportunity to set such an agenda, because of their limited author-
ity and discretionary space. Osmundsen et al. (2012) have also
noted that regulators are expected to do the difﬁcult task of bal-
ancing goals, while their framework conditions are too rigid to give
sufﬁcient authority or ﬂexibility. With limited resources, the regu-
lators cannot develop adequately and might not be able to increase
safety (as described by Walters et al. (2011)).
As the regulatory bodies are part of a society with short-term
economic and efﬁciency criteria (Rasmussen, 1997; Hollnagel,
2009), they also must operate with a business rationale. The polit-
ical ministries have more goals than safe sailing. They are con-
cerned with trade and economic growth. It is common that
societies put production before protection (Reason, 1997). Never-
theless, when the Norwegian government established the regula-
tory bodies with the purpose of preserving sea safety, the
intention seem to have been to give the regulators discretionary
space to promote safety. In practice, the regulators still must be
sensitive to media and the industry’s needs. The regulators talk
about the difference between their profession (prioritizing safety/
protection) and politics (prioritizing industry/production). Profes-
sionally, they would like to prioritize safety, but the political own-
ers – including the public and industry – value trade and less
spending. The regulators therefore aim to get ‘‘most safety per dol-
lar’’ (as they say) to optimize proﬁt for the society. Their budgets
give minimal resources of time and people (also described by
Walters et al. (2011)). The regulators try to get just enough infor-
mation to be able to harmonize the most important actors’ deci-
sion-criteria within time budgets, and to avoid blame.3 This can
be seen as an efﬁciency/thoroughness trade-off, which most profes-
sionals experience (Hollnagel, 2009). The regulators have so many
considerations to make prior to their decisions that they cannot real-
ize projects they want.
Minimal discretionary space can lead to inertia, and literature
describes regulators’ lack of action and competence (Roe, 2013;
Johnson, 2014). However, the regulators in this study emphasize
that they do as much they can to prevent accidents. Some decisions
cannot meet criteria of both safety and business, or compliance and
consensus, but the regulators ﬁght to prioritize after their profes-a
Table 7
Example of public representations and issue ampliﬁers in the maritime arena.
The Norwegian Shipowners’
Association
represents app. 160 shipowners and 1800 vessels in tanker and bulk transport; short sea and offshore sector. Goal: ‘‘A broad
agenda for impact and inﬂuence’’ – to protect members’ interests in industrial and employment issues, and play an active role in
industry concerns
The Association of Cargo Freighters represents Norwegian shipowners with a total of app. 300 cargo vessels. Goal: To raise the industry’s economic and social
conditions and ensure its interests in relations with government, charterers, etc.
The Norwegian Seafarers’ Union represents app. 100,000 seafarers working on Norwegian and foreign vessels all over the world. Goal: Secure safe wage and
working conditions for all groups of seafarers, both domestic and abroad
The Norwegian Association of
Maritime Ofﬁcers
represents app. 8000 maritime leaders, such as captains and mates, in all types of ships, in Norway and abroad. One of the main
goals is to use inﬂuence to ensure framework conditions
The Norwegian Association of
Engineers
represent app. 6000 members at sea and on shore, and works for the members’ working conditions, such as wages, safety, and
competence
Issue ampliﬁers in the maritime arena can also be different types of media, environmental organizations, classiﬁcation companies, insurance companies, and other groups and
non-governmental organizations – national and international.
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more or different actions, they have the discretionary space to
enforce regulation securely.
To abstract the ﬁndings: this analysis shows regulatory actors
constrained in their decision-making (insufﬁcient resources or
authority), and thereby have limited discretionary space to make
decisions according to their own criteria. In spite of the narrow dis-
cretionary space and multiple constrains, they make the most out
of the situation and take measures within their boundaries.
Theory-wise, most of the decision-making literature’s con-
straints and criteria gathered by Rosness (2009) are recognizable
in the regulator descriptions. However, this study exposes limita-
tions in the theory, because some of the mentioned criteria are in
practice constraints for the regulators: proﬁt, consensus, and sta-
tus of the decision-maker (where the decision is the politicians’
and not the regulators’) are often contrary to the main criteria
of safety, compliance, and consistency. Trying to meet all criteria
can also constrain the decision-making. When the literature
needs so much elaboration, it indicates that there is not
enough research on decision-making from the regulators’ point
of view.
The regulators emphasize several reasons for their constraints
and limited discretionary space. For instance, national regulations
are coupled with international agreements, and therefore subopti-
mal tools; political owners can determine or overrule the regula-
tors’ priorities; the internationality and fear of ‘‘ﬂagging out’’
makes the industry powerful, as opposed to the regulators. The
ﬁrst reasons are common for regulators in general, and the last is
found also by Lindøe et al. (2011). Together, they show that the
Norwegian maritime regulators’ decision-making is constrained
by other actors’ criteria, so the arena around the regulators needs
examination.
5.2. Safety decisions in the maritime arena
How the maritime arena affects Norwegian regulatory decisions
is discussed in this section.
Relevant literature states that regulators are dependent on the
international context, the public’s interest, politicians’ priorities,
and the industry’s ﬁnancial capacity (Lindøe et al., 2011; Rosness,
2009; Bratspies, 2009; Walters et al., 2011; Walters and Bailey,
2013; Reason, 1997; etc.). The regulators’ drawing of the maritime
arena takes this further, and shows that competition is a key attri-
bute that results in proﬁt being optimized instead of safety, caus-
ing paralysis in maritime safety regulation development (and
thus further constraining the regulators).
The regulators depict the maritime arena as a place where most
actors have many constraints and conﬂicting goals, so the arena
cannot land upon joint inventive safety decisions. Lindøe et al.
(2011) have shown that even multiple seafarers’ loss of life is notenough to make actors prioritize safety. Some studies show that
ratiﬁed international conventions can result in better maritime
safety (i.e. Knapp and Franses, 2009; Knapp and Van de Velden,
2011), while others dispute that regulations can reduce accidents
when many states ratify, but still does not implement conventions
(Knudsen and Hassler, 2011). About regulation, both the regulator
interviews and previous research (see for example, Almklov et al.
(2014), Dekker (2014), Bieder and Bourrier (2013), Walters and
Bailey (2013), and Antonsen et al. (2012)) suggest that achieved
safety conventions from the last few years have not developed
the regulation; instead, they have lowered standards and used
worn-out regulatory ideas of standardization, audibility, and
accountability. The non-existing safety-regulation development
indicates a political paralysis, to use Renn’s (1992) term. Paralysis
of safety regulation development is connected with competition:
competition between maritime transport and other transport sec-
tors, and especially competition between the countries and compa-
nies in the maritime transport industry.
Maritime transport is often low priced in order to compete with
other transport sectors. The harsh competition leads many trans-
porters to live continuously near bankruptcy, while others have a
solid ﬁnancial situation. The companies, shipowners, and general
maritime transport industry see no other solution, if their business
is to survive, than to shorten the margins so as to be cheaper than
trucks and trains. This is often argued by the companies (to the
regulators) as to why they cannot spend more on safety solutions
than is regulatory required.
Competition between countries and companies in the maritime
industry leads to at least three aspects that favors proﬁt and hinder
safety regulation development.
First, some countries or markets cannot afford to maintain high
safety standards. This is one reason why the consensus-based
international structures struggle to decide upon safety regulation.
All countries represented in the IMO must agree before a conven-
tion is reached. Consequently, possible treaties have to ﬁt to all
types of economies and waters, and therefore can take up to a dec-
ade to accomplish. When the general argument is that everything
must be able to be applied and complied with in every country,
none of the arena actors are able to persuade the others to invest
in expensive safety regulation. Therefore, from the Norwegian reg-
ulators’ point of view, standards are set too low to be particularly
useful. Walters and Bailey (2013) show that globalisation and the
political and industrial economic-priority result in unsafe condi-
tions for the seafarers.
Second, politicians usually want as much activity and trade as
possible in their country. Norway is ratifying the conventions
from the EU, IMO, ILO, etc., with some national additions, but
stricter safety demands seldom are added. This is because scru-
pulous regulation is associated with fewer international compet-
itive abilities for Norwegian industry. Decision-makers do not
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owners have limited investment capacity. Political decisions (and
thereby regulators) are constrained by the fear of ruining busi-
nesses, industries, and communities. In addition, high safety
demands are believed to stop foreign ships from coming to Nor-
wegian waters and ports, or provoke other countries to answer
with protectionism, leading Norwegian shipping or other indus-
tries abroad to suffer (as also DeSombre (2006) points out more
generally). The latter argument is also used by those wanting to
keep businesses from moving to other countries. This takes us
to the third and last argument of why international transport
competition in the maritime arena leads to paralysis in safety
regulation development.
Third is the scare of ‘‘out-ﬂagging.’’ Some states offer conve-
nience ﬂags, which enforce mild regulation on ships and shipown-
ers, and allow them to operate almost all over the world with
limited control and safety demands (Kristiansen, 2005). Politicians
fear that implementing special national rules can encourage their
ﬂeet to leave Norwegian ship registers and thereby trade balance.
DeSombre (2006) say this makes states race toward the regulatory
bottom (but governmental and issue amplifying actors can pres-
sure the regulation-makers in the opposite direction, to the regula-
tory middle). Increased accidents the last years are strongly linked
with new or expanding ﬂags (Robers et al., 2013). This study’s reg-
ulators explain that all arena actors consider safety as important,
but there is no use in safety regulation if one does not have an
industry to regulate because it went bankrupt or ﬂagged out. This
logic makes safety regulation difﬁcult.
All these examples reveal that many arena actors – in the per-
spective of the regulators – think mostly of competition, and
make decisions to optimize proﬁt, not safety. The accidents and
competition challenges in the maritime arena make the actors
prioritize diversely (see also Fig. 1). International institutions
facilitate for safety, but politicians prioritize trade and worry
about out-ﬂagging, protectionism, and budgets, and delegate
safety to regulators. Industry and interest groups do not want
accidents either, but set economic survival and proﬁt ﬁrst (as
generally clariﬁed by Reason (1997)). Some regulations have been
agreed upon during the last few years (such as the Maritime
Labour Convention in 2006; effective from 2013), but according
to the interviewed regulators, the conventions are half-hearted
and too elementary. Actual development requires priority. None
of the maritime actors have enough resources to convince each
other to invest deeply in safety regulation. In the wording of
Renn (1992), there is political paralysis in maritime-safety regula-
tion development. It is also possible to call it a regulation paraly-
sis, because the regulation development is paralyzed. If using that
term, it is important to emphasize that the regulators’ regulation
enforcement is constrained, not paralyzed.
When regulation development is paralyzed, it constrains the
regulators’ safety facilitation. The regulations that exist are
enforced, but the regulators do not see their discretionary space
as sufﬁcient to maintain sea safety. The interviewed regulators
experience double standards when the politicians and ministries
employ regulators to work for safety, while the ministries in prac-
tice want the regulators to prioritize what is in the media spotlight.
Mearns (2014) has also pointed out the double standards of politi-
cians and society, when the public expects to consume cheap prod-
ucts, but after accidents is stunned by poor safety measures. In my
study, the regulators wonder if it had been easier if their owners
also had safety as the ﬁrst priority. Nevertheless, they do not
believe that one actor could be so powerful and resourceful that
it could persuade the industry into prioritizing safety, and thus
end the paralysis in the maritime arena. If the public were sufﬁ-
ciently interested in safe maritime transport, it would be another
case.6. Conclusion and comments
To ﬁnd out what inﬂuences maritime safety regulation, I have
analyzed interviews with Norwegian maritime regulators, together
with information about other maritime actors. The empirical data
go further than, but are not contradictory to, earlier research.
This study highlights a serious international issue: Even though
the maritime accident rate calls for better safety regulation, trans-
port competition makes many maritime actors prioritize proﬁt
rather than safety, which paralyzes safety regulation development
and constrains the maritime safety regulators. Because the market
forces get precedence over safety, paralyzed innovative formation
and constrained enforcement of regulation weaken the safety reg-
ulation double. According to the regulators, when the maritime
arena rarely agrees upon safety standards, these standards are
set too low and are non-innovative. Thus, development does not
happen. (This can be shortened to regulation paralysis.) The regula-
tors are not paralyzed, though; but they must do their job within a
small discretionary space and without suitable tools – and some-
times the politicians override their decisions. The regulation
becomes even weaker if the regulators formally are the only actors
to prioritize safety in the maritime arena, yet their decisions are
contaminated. With more discretionary space, the regulators could
prioritize which transport sectors need most safety attention, and
which regulations could prevent the most accidents.
Different opinions about which problem to solve ﬁrst – sur-
vival or safety – stand in the way for transport safety. Implicit
in the interviews lies a skepticism against the widely accepted
idea that low safety demands are the only way to keep the mar-
itime transport industry alive. To ignore the need for safety reg-
ulation in order to keep all companies’ heads above water will
probably not lead to more safety in either the short or the long
run (as Walters and Bailey (2013) strongly underline). For the
regulators, it is common to consider whether or not the compa-
nies are able to overcome potential safety regulations ﬁnancially.
If the companies continuously are close to bankruptcy, there will
never be more safety or thriving maritime transport industries.
Rather, reducing safety demands can create a negative spiral,
where poorer and poorer organizations give poorer services and
become less safe, and thus scare the costumers away. That could
paralyze the entire industry, not just safety regulation develop-
ment. When some coastal cargo companies are functioning on a
bare minimum, they stay at a minimum, with no developmental
possibilities or power (Størkersen et al., 2011). If the government
really wants the industry to survive, they must fully prioritize it.
When the amount of accidents is not decreasing, it is important
to give enough resources to safety protection, and to search for
measures that actually work (as also stated by Bieder and
Bourrier, 2013).
A persistent question in the aftermath of this study is how to
end the regulation development paralysis in practice. The regula-
tors’ present solution is balancing and translation, but this does
not eliminate the problem. There is a need for contemporary
research on the pros and cons of the different maritime regulation
strategies, or of transport regulation in general. It can be appropri-
ate to research the ministries’ discretionary space, and to discover
how actors could be convinced to invest in safety. Today, the mar-
itime transport actors seem to be penny wise and pound foolish,
when they save on safety standards to save the industry.Acknowledgements
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